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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 2004 presidential election, a group known as Swift Boat
Veterans for Truth released a series of television advertisements calling into question the military service of Democratic candidate John
Kerry. These advertisements disputed the honesty and patriotism of
Senator Kerry and even challenged the legitimacy of the medals he
earned during his service in the Vietnam War.1 The claims made in
these advertisements were eventually exposed to be false or misleading, and they were criticized by Democratic and Republican leadership alike.2 Indeed, this attack on Senator Kerry’s patriotism is one of
the most reviled examples of dishonest partisanship in the modern
electoral era. Nonetheless, the Swift Boat advertisements are widely
thought to have affected the outcome of the election.3
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth is a political organization chartered
under section 527 of the U.S. Tax Code. These groups are funded by
contributions from individual citizens and can spend unlimited
amounts of money on campaign advertisements, so long as they do
not expressly advocate the election or defeat of specific candidates.4
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Florida State University College of Law. Special
thanks to Professor Franita Tolson, my parents, and Tanya for their gracious help and
advice in completing this Note.
1. The advertisements produced by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth can be found at
the organization’s website. See TV Ads and Videos, SWIFT VETS AND POWS FOR TRUTH,
http://horse.he.net/~swiftpow/index.php?topic=Ads (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Kate Zernike & Jim Rutenberg, Friendly Fire: The Birth of an Anti-Kerry Ad,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/politics/campaign/20swift.html
(noting that “on close examination, the accounts of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth prove to be
riddled with inconsistencies”).
3. See, e.g., Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Conservatives Laud Swift Boat Veterans, FOX
NEWS.COM (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,147728,00.html.
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2006).
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In the 2004 election cycle, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth raised $27
million worth of individual contributions, of which they spent
$24 million.5
While the Swift Boat Veterans were allowed to raise and spend
these vast amounts of money on their attack ads, federal law had
long prohibited corporations and unions from doing the same. Specifically, the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibited corporations
from using their general treasury funds to expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate, contribute directly to a candidate’s
campaign fund, or release “electioneering communications”—
advertisements that discuss candidates for federal office but do not
expressly advocate their election or defeat.6 These restrictions on corporate spending ability were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on
numerous occasions.7
This body of campaign finance law was recently turned on its head
by the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC).8 In this landmark case, the Court struck down the
prohibitions against using corporate funds for electioneering communications and express advocacy.9 To reach this outcome, the Court
equated the legal and actual identity of corporations and natural persons under the First Amendment.10 In so doing, the Court paid homage to a theory of corporate personhood known as the “natural person
theory,” which sees the existence of human beings and corporations
as legally and factually indistinguishable.11 The Court’s reliance on
the natural person theory is misplaced for three major reasons: first,
the theory is divorced from observable reality; second, the theory is
logically incoherent; and third, the theory is inconsistent with the
meaning and purpose of the Constitution.
While it is too early to discern the full impact of the Citizens United decision, there is much cause for concern. The potential torrent of
corporate funding that may now enter the electoral system could reduce our leaders’ accountability to the larger public and undermine
the government’s ability to hold elections free of corruption and improper influence. As previously mentioned, Swift Boat Veterans for
5. Scott Helman, ‘Soft Money’ Battle Brewing: Millions Raised; Attack Ads Set, BOSGLOBE (Apr. 6, 2008), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/04/06/
soft_money_battle_brewing/
6. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
7. For examples, see, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), discussed in Part III infra.
8. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
9. See id. at 917.
10. Id. at 900.
11. This model is also referred to as the “natural entity” or “real entity” theory. Phillip
I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 283, 295 (1990).
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Truth spent roughly $24 million on a series of advertisements that
arguably affected the outcome of the election. In 2007 alone, ExxonMobil reported profits of over $40 billion.12 What will happen if companies of this size divert portions of their massive war chests to electioneering efforts? It is not difficult to envision the voices of average
Americans being hopelessly drowned out.
Furthermore, there is no telling what other kinds of socially useful
legislation will now be invalidated under the principle that corporations and persons have equivalent First Amendment speech rights.
The further the Citizens United principle is extended, the more the
federal and state governments will cede the power to regulate for the
public good. Armed with the Citizens United precedent, industry
leaders are now in a position to do some “swiftboating” of their own,
and the American people are just along for the ride.
Part II of this Note will examine the three major legal theories of
corporate personhood and provide examples of their use in the
Court’s jurisprudence. Part III will examine the use of these theories
in the Court’s campaign finance decisions. This section will attempt
to demonstrate that the bulk of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence adheres to the artificial person theory, a model that sees
corporations and people as legally distinct and supports state regulatory powers.13 Part IV will examine the Citizens United decision itself
as well as the Court’s implicit reliance on the more antiregulatory
natural person theory. Part V of the article will expose the realistic,
logical, and historical flaws of the natural person theory and argue
that Citizens United was wrongly decided. Finally, Part VI will explore the potential impacts of Citizens United.
II. LEGAL THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
Throughout its jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has util–
ized three general theories of corporate personhood: the artificial person theory, the aggregate person theory, and the natural person theory. These three theories cover a wide range of ideology on the topic of
corporate personhood. At one end of the spectrum is the artificial person theory, which posits that corporations are not really persons at
all, but rather inanimate creatures of the law.14 At the opposite end
of the continuum is the natural person theory, which treats corporations as actual persons.15 Often, the Court’s use of these theories is
confused or intermixed. A good example of this phenomenon is the
12. David Ellis, Exxon Shatters Profit Records, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 1, 2008, 2:26
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/01/news/companies/exxon_earnings/.
13. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 292-93.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 295.
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Court’s holding in Hale v. Henkel.16 In one portion of the majority
opinion, the Court held that corporations are not persons under the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, noting that “the corporation is a creature of the state. .
. . presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.”17 Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court used the aggregate person theory18 to
decide that corporations are people for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable searches, stating that “[a]
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”19 Despite this occasional confusion, however, the Court’s view on corporate personhood
usually can be traced to one of the three major theories.
A. Artificial Person Theory
The artificial person theory (also known as the concession theory)
is premised on the notion that corporations are fictional entities dependant on the state for their existence.20 Under this model, corporations are not really people at all. Instead, their occasional classification as people is merely a tool of economic and judicial convenience.
The artificial person theory thus recognizes a stark distinction between tangible natural citizens and intangible business entities. Under this view, a corporation is “an artificial creation of human beings
and the law . . . . [given] personhood status solely as a legal fiction to
facilitate commerce.”21
A second, and perhaps more important, aspect of the artificial person theory is its view of the relationship between the corporation and
the state. Under this model, the corporation has no existence outside
of the law; without the law’s consent, the corporation simply does not
exist (hence the term “concession theory”).22 The artificial person theory characterizes corporations as “the creation of the legislature, owing [their] existence to state action, rather than to the acts of [their]
shareholder-incorporators.”23 The logical extension of this view is that
corporate rights are limited to those granted in corporate charters,
rather than those possessed by natural persons.24
16. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
17. Id. at 74.
18. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 293-94.
19. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
20. Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach
to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 106-07 (2009).
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id. at 107.
23. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 292.
24. Ripken, supra note 20, at 108 (claiming that, under the artificial person theory,
“[w]hat the state can give, the state can take away”); see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839) (noting that “[t]he only rights [a corporation] can claim are
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The artificial person theory was the prevailing mode of legal analysis in the period between the ratification of the Constitution and the
mid-to-late nineteenth century.25 The Court’s jurisprudence during
this era reflected uneasiness about corporations and their ability to
amass wealth. As such, many of the Court’s early decisions recognize
sharp distinctions between the rights of corporations and natural persons and uphold broad congressional and state regulatory powers.26
The most prominent example of the artificial person theory in the
entirety of the Court’s jurisprudence comes from the 1819 decision of
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.27 In this case, the Court
considered the legal status of the charter of Dartmouth College. In a
now famous passage, Chief Justice Marshall paid homage to the artificial person theory, stating that “[a] corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. . . .
[that] possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”28 Through this statement, the Court made clear
that corporations stand on a different legal footing than natural citizens; they are neither “Citizens” nor part of “We the People” as described in the Constitution.29
This understanding of corporate status was also reinforced by the
Court’s early Article III jurisprudence. In this line of cases, the Court
was tasked with determining how corporations would be allowed
standing to sue (and be sued) on behalf of their members, given that
Article III refers only to “Citizens.”30 In Marshall v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company,31 the Court once again answered this question using the artificial person theory, holding that a corporation is
not a “citizen” but rather a legal fiction designed for jurisdictional
purposes. Specifically, the Court held that the notion of corporate
personhood (with respect to standing) was developed merely to prevent corporations from avoiding diversity jurisdiction by placing
shareholders in every state; instead, a corporation would be treated
the rights which are given to it in that character, and not the rights which belong to its
members as citizens of a state”).
25. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 292-93.
26. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546 (1837)
(“[I]n grants by the public, nothing passes by implication. . . . ‘[A] corporation is strictly
limited to the exercise of those powers which are specifically conferred on it . . . . The exercise of the corporate franchise being restrictive of individual rights, cannot be extended
beyond the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation.’ ” (quoting Beaty v. Lessee of
Knowler, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152, 168 (1830))).
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
28. Id. at 636.
29. David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, “A Capitalist Joker”: Corporations, Corporate Personhood, and the Constitution 4-8 (Dec. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.theusconstitution.org/upload/fck/file/File_storage/CAC-Corporations-Narrative12-3-09-draft.pdf.
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
31. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
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as a separate person with a single state of residence for the purposes of
jurisdiction.32 This limited justification for corporate personhood “would
be the one place in which corporations were treated as citizens under
the Constitution” in the jurisprudence of the early Court and would lay
the foundation for many of the Court’s subsequent decisions.33
Although the artificial entity theory fell out of favor between the
late nineteenth century and the end of the now-reviled Lochner Era,
it would reemerge to instruct the Court’s thinking during the New
Deal. Struggling through the hardships of the Great Depression, a
Court with four members appointed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt
attempted to roll back the vagaries of the Lochner Era and reassert
state regulatory power over corporate affairs. A good example of the
Court’s renewed adherence to the artificial person theory is National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,34 a case that
upheld Congress’s power to regulate corporate affairs under the
commerce clause.35 Numerous other decisions during this period
scaled back the constitutional rights of corporations. For example,
the New Deal Court ruled that corporate rights are necessarily less
than those enjoyed by natural persons with regard to the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment36 and the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.37
As will be discussed, the artificial person theory would also influence much of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence prior to
Citizens United.
B. Aggregate Person Theory
A second theory of corporate personhood, the aggregate person
theory, became popular with the advent of general incorporation
statutes in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.38 This theory blurs the
distinction between corporations and natural persons, arguing that
corporations are best viewed as collections of individuals, rather than
singular, fictional entities.39 In fact, the aggregate person theory pos-

32. Id. at 328.
33. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 9.
34. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35. See id. at 37, 49.
36. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (“The constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.”).
37. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. They are endowed
with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive
the privilege of acting as artificial entities.” (citation omitted)).
38. See Ripken, supra note 20, at 109-10.
39. Id. at 110.
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its that corporations have no existence separate from that of their
members.40 Under this theory, a corporation:
could not be formed without the action and agreement of human
beings. In fact, no corporate acts would ever occur without the human persons who made up the corporate entity. Therefore, the
corporation was seen more as a collection, or aggregate, of individuals who contracted with each other to utilize the corporation for
their mutual benefit.41

Unlike the artificial person theory, the aggregate person theory views the corporation “not [as] a creature of the state but of
individual initiative and enterprise.”42
Under this model, the legal rights of corporations are equated to
the individual rights of corporate shareholders, rather than limited to
those conceded by the legislature.43 The aggregate person theory argues that corporate property is nothing more than the collective
property of the company’s shareholders, investors, and personnel.
Following this logic, corporations should be regulated under the same
property laws that govern the individuals who compose them.44 The
aggregate person theory also posits that corporations exist for private
(rather than public) purposes. Thus, the role of the law under this
theory is to support corporate shareholders and to avoid interfering
with their private actions.45 Like the natural person theory, to be discussed infra, the aggregate person theory is a fundamentally
antiregulatory model.
The aggregate person theory became popular in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century, a period characterized by popular frustration
with the perceived legislative favoritism surrounding the award of
corporate charters.46 During this era, “[s]pecial incorporations for
businesses were regarded as the corrupt result of legislative bribery,

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 185 (1985).
43. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 3 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 2d ed. 1886) (“[I]t is essential . . . to bear in mind distinctly, that
the existence of a corporation independently of its shareholders is a fiction; and that the
rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the
persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”).
44. See Ripken, supra note 20, at 110.
45. See David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood 5 (Washington & Lee Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264141 (“By appealing to the
individual property rights of the shareholders, the aggregate idea offered a potentially useful
theoretical justification for shielding big business from public supervision.”).
46. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634 (1988); Ripken, supra note 20, at 109.
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political favoritism, and monopolistic practices.”47 As such, the second
half of the nineteenth century witnessed the spread of general incorporation statutes designed to allow corporations to form without the
express consent of state legislatures.48 The Court’s jurisprudence
shifted along with these popular sentiments, eventually adopting the
aggregate person theory to curtail legislative regulatory authority.49
One of the most famous judicial expositions of the aggregate person theory actually comes from a district court opinion written by
Justice Field. In the Railroad Tax Cases, a consolidation of several
challenges to state taxation schemes, the district court held that “[t]o
deprive the corporation of its property . . . is, in fact, to deprive the
corporators of their property,” and, as such, corporations were to be
treated as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Interestingly,
the Railroad Tax decision was concerned less with the inherent
rights of the corporation and more with the need to protect individual
rights manifested in the corporate form. According to Justice Field:
It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such
protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. . . . [T]he courts will always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it represents.51

According to several legal scholars, this aggregated view of corporate personhood also informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company,52 which
held that corporate property could not be taxed differently than that
of individual citizens.53 While Santa Clara did not ultimately explore
the issue of whether corporations are persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment, it did clearly state that they should be treated as such
in a footnote.54 Although this declaration could be viewed as an expo47. Ripken, supra note 20, at 109.
48. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 20-21 (1975).
49. See Ripken, supra note 20, at 110.
50. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
51. Id. at 744.
52. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
53. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 1642 (“Santa Clara does not represent the
Supreme Court's rejection of older ‘associational’ or ‘fictional’ theories of the corporation in
favor of an ‘entity’ theory that imputed a great deal of personhood to the corporation itself.
On the contrary, the Court relied explicitly on the idea that a corporation is an association
of individuals. Its interests are identical to those of its shareholders. As a result, it should
receive the same protections granted to any partnership or sole proprietorship.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also Horwitz, supra note 42, at 223.
54. The Santa Clara decision is the subject of much scholarship and debate, as the
Court never truly reached the question of whether corporations are to be treated as persons
under the law. Instead, the court reporter, himself a former corporate executive, included
in the transcript of the case the statement: “MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court

2011]

SWIFT BOAT CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY

395

sition of the natural person theory of corporate personhood, Professor
Horwitz explains that this theory did not emerge until several years
after Santa Clara.55 Logically, then, the Court must have employed
the aggregate person reasoning of the Railroad Tax Cases.
As corporations continued to grow in size and number, the aggregate person theory began to lose vitality in the Court’s jurisprudence.
Because corporations took on so many shareholders, it became difficult to think of them as groups of homogenous, aligned individuals.56
As such, a new theory of corporate personhood would appear by the
beginning of the twentieth century.
C. Natural Person Theory
The legal theory of corporate personhood that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century viewed corporations as actual persons, dependant neither on state law nor individual shareholders for
their existence.57 This model, known as “natural person theory” or
“natural entity theory,” proposes that the existence of a corporation is
no different than that of a natural-born person.58 Under the natural
person theory, a corporation “is a full-fledged, living reality that exists as an objective fact and has a real personality in society.”59 Professor Ripken uses the analogy of childbirth to explain the theory,
noting that the creation of a corporation is the same as the birth of a
natural person.60 As with a newborn baby, the state plays no part in
birthing a corporation; rather, the state’s only role in its creation is to
memorialize the event with a charter of incorporation (or birth certificate, as it were).61 Under the natural person theory, a corporation is
not the product of legislative consent but “simply a natural outgrowth of the economic tendency toward business combination.”62 As
such, the corporation is not an artificial entity but rather a naturally
existing person “which has compelled the law to grant it official rec-

does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that
it does.” Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. Many wonder whether this statement was ever
made at oral argument, or if it was part of a larger “conspiracy” to smuggle the notion of
corporate personhood into constitutional dialogue. For more reading on this subject, see
Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J.
371 (1938) [hereinafter Graham, The Conspiracy Theory I]; Howard Jay Graham, The
“Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938).
55. Horwitz, supra note 42, at 183.
56. Ripken, supra note 20, at 111-12.
57. Id. at 112.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 112-13.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 113.
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ognition.”63 The natural person theory diverges from the aggregate
person theory with respect to its view of the relationship between
corporation and shareholder. Under the natural person theory, corporations exist separately from the lives of their shareholders and not
because of them. In other words, the natural entity theory argues
that corporations actually are persons—not just that they should be
treated as such to protect the rights of their shareholders. Natural
entity theorists are quick to point out that corporations have perpetual lives that outlast those of individual shareholders and that corporate actions cannot be said to be the product of any one person.64 As
such, corporations are persons as much as you and I, and have “the
same legal, social, and moral responsibilities that natural persons
carry, as well as the same rights and protections.”65
The natural person theory gained popularity in the early twentieth century and was the primary mode of analysis in the now infamous Lochner Era. This period of legal history is characterized by the
Court’s adherence to a laissez-faire economic philosophy anchored by
the “liberty of contract,” a concept with almost no constitutional
mooring.66 Fearful of the “present assault upon capital,” an increasingly conservative and business-friendly Court began using the notion of corporate personhood to infuse businesses with the individual
rights necessary to challenge state and federal regulations.67 The
Court’s decision in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis68
provides a useful example. This case concerned a state law requiring
railroad companies to pay their opponents’ legal fees, an obligation
not placed on natural citizens or other types of businesses.69 In determining that this restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court essentially declared it unconstitutional for the legislature
to differentiate between corporations and persons. Citing the infamous Santa Clara footnote, the Court held that “corporations are
persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . A
State has no more power to deny to corporations the equal protection
of the law than it has to individual citizens.”70 The language of this
holding is telling. The Court did not hold that corporations should
63. W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q. REV.
365, 370 (1905).
64. See id. at 366-72.
65. Ripken, supra note 20, at 102; see also Julie Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical Foundations of First and Fourteenth Amendment
Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1738 (2008) (describing the natural entity theory as inherently antiregulatory).
66. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 24 (quoting Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895) (Field, J., concurring)).
68. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
69. Id. at 152-53.
70. Id. at 154.
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enjoy constitutional protections to vindicate the rights of their shareholders but instead determined that corporations are individuals in
and of themselves. This is arguably the most lucid exposition of the
natural person theory in all of the Court’s jurisprudence.
Subsequent Lochner Era decisions further undermined legislatures’ ability to distinguish between the existence of corporations and
natural persons. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, for example, the
Court struck down a minimum wage law,71 noting that a corporation
such as the petitioner hospital has a constitutional right to “obtain . .
. the best terms . . . as the result of private bargaining,”72 and, implicitly, that the constitutional right to such “liberty of contract” is the
same for both natural persons and corporations.73
While this extreme adherence to the natural person theory would
meet its demise with the end of the Lochner Era, it still occasionally
finds its way into the Court’s opinions. As will be discussed, this theory has risen again to inform the Court’s decision in Citizens United.
III. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD IN THE COURT’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE
JURISPRUDENCE
The Court’s corporate personhood jurisprudence, with respect to
questions of free speech and campaign spending, largely adheres to
the artificial person theory. With one exception, the Court’s decisions
prior to Citizens United recognize both a distinction between the
First Amendment rights of corporations and persons as well as the
need for legislative regulation of corporate spending abilities.74 Before
examining the relevant precedent, however, a word about the Court’s
decision in Buckley v. Valeo75 is necessary.
The Court’s landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo established the
basic framework upon which all of the Court’s subsequent campaign
finance jurisprudence is based. In this case, the Court was tasked
with reviewing the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).76 In order to curb the influence of private spending
on elections and political accountability, this act established limits on
both direct campaign contributions as well as independent campaignrelated expenditures.77 Before reaching the constitutionality of the
act, however, the Court was first faced with an even more fundamental question: is spending money a form of speech protected by the
71. 261 U.S. 525, 539, 562 (1923).
72. Id. at 545.
73. Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 28.
74. The exception being First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
discussed infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
75. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
76. Id. at 6.
77. See id. at 7.
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First Amendment? The Court answered in the affirmative, holding
that the expenditure of money is essential to “the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression.”78 As such, the spending limitations of FECA were subjected
to strict scrutiny review.79 The direct contribution limits established
in FECA withstood this review; the Court recognized a compelling
state interest in curtailing the potential corruption that might be
caused by limitless donations to a candidate’s election fund.80 The
independent expenditure limits, conversely, were held to be unconstitutional.81 The Court reasoned that this restriction was too attenuated from the problem of improper influence that FECA was designed
to curtail.82 It is important to note, however, that Buckley only considered restrictions placed on natural citizens. Federal law after
Buckley maintained similar expenditure limitations on corporations,
and until Citizens United, these restrictions were upheld.83
The limitations placed on corporate spending ability were upheld
largely because the modern Court has generally adhered to the artificial person theory of corporate personhood. With the exception of
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,84 the Court’s campaign finance decisions recognize that “the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation” to circumvent the potential for corruption and improper influence in the electoral system.85 In repeatedly upholding the power of Congress to regulate corporate election spending, the Court clearly delineated between the legal identities of corporations and persons, as such restrictions would not otherwise be permissible under Buckley.
One of the premier examples of the artificial person theory in the
Court’s campaign finance decisions comes from Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce.86 This case considered the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting corporations from using their general
treasury funds to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate within a certain timeframe.87 The Court recognized a compelling government interest in preventing corporate dominance of the electoral process and thus upheld the restriction.88 The seminal statement
78. Id. at 59.
79. Id. at 44-45.
80. Id. at 23-38, 58-59.
81. Id. at 58-59.
82. Id. at 45-51.
83. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
84. See discussion infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
85. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-210 (1982).
86. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
87. Id. at 654-55.
88. Id. at 659 (“[T]he compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corpo-
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from the case belies the Court’s adherence to the artificial person
theory:
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital . . . . These state-created advantages not only allow
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but
also permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”89

It was apparent to the Austin Court that corporations could not hope
to enjoy these special state-created privileges as well as the constitutional protections afforded to natural-born citizens. The opposite result would allow the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” to play an unfair role in the electoral process.90
The Austin “anti-distortion” rationale was subsequently upheld in
McConnell v. FEC,91 a case that directly considered the constitutionality of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) at issue
in Citizens United.92 Congress passed BCRA in response to concerns
about the amount of corporate spending on independent attack ads
that escaped the restrictions of FECA.93 BCRA attempted to close the
FECA loophole by outlawing the use of corporate funds on “electioneering communications,” a form of campaign advertising that does
not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for office.94 Recognizing the “unusually important interests [that] underlie
the regulation of corporations’ campaign-related speech,”95 the Court
again approved the law’s distinction between the First Amendment
rights of corporations and natural persons.96 This holding is consistent with the artificial person theory; if the Court considered corporations as persons (or even as aggregate persons) the spending restriction would constitute an impermissible restriction on speech rights
under Buckley. This congressional power to distinguish between hu-

rate form.” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985))).
89. Id. at 658-59 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
90. Id. at 660.
91. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
92. Id. at 93.
93. See id. at 207.
94. See id. at 93-94.
95. Id. at 206 n.88.
96. See id. at 207.
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man beings and corporations for purposes of campaign spending was
upheld as recently as 2007.97
The major exception to the Court’s recognition of the artificial person theory is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.98 This case
concerned a state limitation on a corporation’s ability to spend money
on advertisements related to ballot referendums.99 Here, the Bellotti
Court rejected any distinction between corporations and persons and
instead held that corporations have a First Amendment right to
spend money on advertisements that advocate the passage or defeat
of referenda.100 The major premise of Bellotti—one that would underlie the Court’s decision in Citizens United—is that the First Amendment does not tolerate discrimination among speakers, at least with
respect to political speech.101 Interestingly, the Court stopped short of
fully adopting free speech rights for corporations. This is largely because the Court’s precedents in this field do not provide much support for that position. Instead, the Court focused on the First
Amendment rights of the listener, rather than those of the speaker.
As Justice Powell explained, “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation . . . or individual.”102
Bellotti is distinct from much of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence because it relies partially on the natural person theory.
In holding that the First Amendment does not tolerate speaker discrimination based on corporate status, the Court implied that the
corporate identity is no different than that of a natural-born citizen.
Further, the Bellotti Court curtailed congressional regulatory powers
in the name of corporate personhood. Clearly, this holding is in line
with the antiregulatory natural person theory.
The Bellotti majority took care to distinguish its decision from
other pertinent precedent, noting that spending restrictions are attenuated from the goal of preventing electoral corruption in the case

97. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
Declining to overturn Austin or McConnell, the Right to Life Court held that corporations
could not use general treasury funds to release political advertisements “susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” Id. at 470. While this decision weakened the regulatory authority of Congress in the
area of corporate campaign finance, it did not eliminate it.
98. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
99. Id. at 768-69.
100. Id. at 786-92.
101. Id. at 784-85. (“In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers
who may address a public issue.”).
102. Id. at 777.
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of ballot referenda.103 Indeed, the notion of improper corporate purchase of political influence does not seem relevant to the case of an
inanimate ballot initiative which cannot become indebted to any one
candidate. This explains why Bellotti was not overruled by the subsequent decisions in Austin or McConnell; the antidistortion rationale espoused in Austin applied only to elections for representative
office. Thus, the logic of Bellotti was not meant to extend beyond its
narrow context, and until Citizens United, it was not.104
IV. CITIZENS UNITED AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
Citizens United v. FEC105 concerned the application of federal campaign finance law to a film entitled Hillary: The Movie (hereinafter
Hillary). Citizens United, a private nonprofit corporation, attempted to
release the film through video-on-demand within thirty days of a 2008
Democratic Party primary election, potentially in contravention of 2
U.S.C. § 441b, which governs corporate electoral spending.106 As such,
Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
FEC, preventing application of the law to its video.107
Prior to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), corporations were barred under § 441b from using their general treasury
funds to make direct contributions to candidates or to finance independent materials that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a
candidate.108 BCRA section 203 added to these restrictions, preventing corporations from using their general funds to support “electioneering communication[s].”109 Electioneering communications are defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made
within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election.110
In order to ameliorate the harshness of these restrictions, § 441b includes a provision allowing corporations to engage in express advocacy and electioneering communication through “Political Action Committees.”111 These bodies, funded solely through “donations from

103. See id. at 787-92; see also id. at 790 (“Referenda are held on issues, not candidates
for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections
simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.” (citations omitted)).
104. Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 869 (2007) (“Indeed, in each subsequent case Bellotti was not treated as a
landmark but relegated to a footnote, distinguished away and limited to its particular facts.”).
105. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
106. Id. at 887.
107. Id. at 888.
108. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
109. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
110. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).
111. § 441b.
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stockholders and employees of the corporation,” are segregated funds
exempted from the aforementioned spending restrictions.112
Hillary ostensibly fell under the purview of § 441b.113 Citizens
United attempted to release the video using its general corporate
funds within the prohibited thirty-day window described by the statute.114 Furthermore, the movie specifically referred to then-Senator
Hillary Clinton, potentially triggering the prohibition against electioneering communications, although it was not initially clear that
materials released through video-on-demand would qualify as such.115
In an attempt to defeat application of this statute to Hillary, Citizens United brought a series of as-applied challenges to § 441b. For
example, Citizens United argued that Hillary did not qualify as an
electioneering communication116 and that it did not constitute express
advocacy.117 Despite the fact that Citizens United waived its facial
constitutional challenge to § 441b, the Court decided to consider it
sua sponte, noting that “the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech.”118
Using Bellotti as its ammunition, the Citizens United Court struck
down § 441b, Austin, and McConnell.119 In so doing, it set forth one of
the most lucid expositions of the natural person theory of corporate
personhood since the Lochner Era. The Court’s opinion is replete
with statements that equate the legal and actual identity of corporations and natural persons. The Court’s oft-repeated mantra is that
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity” under the strictures of the First Amendment.120 The implication of this statement is clear: the identity of a
corporation is no different than that of a natural person for purposes
of the First Amendment. Citing Bellotti, a case not meant to apply
outside the context of voter referenda, the majority claimed that
“[t]he Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natu-

112. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
113. See id. at 890.
114. Id. at 888.
115. Id. at 887-88. For instance, the Code of Federal Regulations describes electioneering communications as “publicly distributed” materials that “[c]an be received by 50,000 or
more persons.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2010). It is not clear that video-on-demand,
which can be viewed only upon purchase or request of the viewer, fits this definition.
116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888-89.
117. Id. at 889-90.
118. Id. at 892.
119. See id. at 913.
120. Id. at 902; see also, e.g., id. at 898 (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”); id. at 899 (“[T]he Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”).
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ral persons.’ ”121 These statements demonstrate the Court’s adherence
to the natural person theory. By refusing to recognize a distinction
between the identities of corporations and persons, the Court is clearly focused on the speech rights of the corporation itself, rather than
the aggregated speech rights of corporate shareholders.122 According
to the Citizens United Court, the corporation should be treated as a
person because it actually is one.
V. THE ILLOGIC OF CITIZENS UNITED AND THE NATURAL
ENTITY THEORY
As previously discussed, the Citizens United Court reached its decision using a mode of analysis consistent with the natural person
theory, which recognizes no distinction between corporation and person and posits that both are entitled to identical constitutional
rights. This Court’s reliance on this theory is misplaced for a number
of reasons. Specifically, the natural person theory contravenes observable reality, logic, and our nation’s legal history.
To begin with, the natural person theory contradicts plainly observable realities. Simply put, corporations are not people.123 They
have no physical form. They do not walk, talk, breathe, or engage in
any number of human activities. They have no feelings or thoughts.
“As a non-human entity, a corporation lacks the expressive interests
related to self-actualization and freedom that human beings possess
by virtue of being human.”124 Having a conversation with a corporation would be akin to having a conversation with a wall, as neither
possesses the hands to write, the vocal chords to speak, the limbs to
gesture, or the mind to engage in independent, expressive thought.
As Justice Rehnquist put it, “[t]o ascribe to such artificial entities an
‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse
metaphor with reality.”125 The natural person theory ignores this
most essential distinction between corporations and persons and is
thus fundamentally flawed.
Even aside from its obvious realistic deficiencies, the natural person theory is logically incoherent. The theory posits that corporate
121. Id. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
122. It is worth noting that the opinion does not include much, if any, language defending the corporate right to political speech on grounds of the aggregate person theory. The
only statement which does seem to reflect the thinking of the aggregate person theory
complains that, under § 441b, “certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have
taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in . . . political speech.” Id. at 908.
123. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2668 (2008) (“Corporations are not human beings. They only have
the qualities and the rights given to them by law, no more, no less.”).
124. Id. at 2646.
125. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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existence depends neither upon state law nor upon the collective efforts of shareholders; instead corporations have lives of their own and
are merely the product of the natural tendency toward business association.126 This too is clearly false. Corporations still depend upon incorporation statutes for their recognition and the conferred benefits
they enjoy. Natural person theorists often claim that the perpetual
life of corporations evidences their separate existence as natural persons.127 This argument, however, misses a larger point—corporations
would not be entitled to benefits such as perpetual life but for state
law. Thus, state legislatures, which can always amend incorporation
statutes, have the final word as to how and when corporations form
and what benefits they receive. So too are corporations dependent on
the individuals who comprise them. While it may be true that incorporation is a natural tendency in a free market, to suggest that corporations have identities separate from those of their makers is ludicrous. Without actual people to associate, pool resources, develop
business models, and file necessary paperwork, corporations would
never exist; without Bill Gates, there would be no Microsoft. Taken to
its logical extreme, the natural person theory might suggest that corporations have no need of such officers or employees, since they are
actual persons themselves, capable of making decisions and speaking
their minds. This is clearly as unrealistic as it is illogical.
The natural person theory also runs afoul of our nation’s legal history. The framers of the Constitution would almost certainly reject
the notion that corporations are among “We the People” for whom the
Constitution was written.128 The Founders saw corporations as dangerous entities to be tightly regulated by the state and granted only
those rights listed in their chartering documents, rather than those
enumerated in the Constitution.129 This notion is reinforced by the
language of the Constitution itself, which protects rights that apply
awkwardly to the corporate context. Indeed, it is difficult to envision
corporations engaging in the “freedom of speech,” enjoying the right
to “peaceably . . . assemble,” practicing the “free exercise” of religion,130 or “keep[ing] and bear[ing] Arms.”131 These are fundamentally
human rights, and to apply them to the corporate setting is to misread the Constitution.
126. See supra Part II.C.
127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (3d sess. 1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of
Rep.
James
Madison),
available
at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=002/llac002.db&recNum=278 (“[A] charter of incorporation . . . creates an artificial person previously not existing in law. It confers important civil
rights and attributes, which could not otherwise be claimed.”).
129. Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 4-8.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Even the Fourteenth Amendment, the hook upon which the notion
of corporate personhood would eventually hang, was not intended to
apply to corporations. Instead, this amendment, adopted after the
Civil War, was designed to safeguard the expanded grant of citizenship to freed slaves.132 Like the Bill of Rights, the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests a narrow applicability to living
persons. The citizenship clause of the amendment, for example, refers to “persons born or naturalized in the United States.”133 Of
course, a corporation cannot be born or naturalized, so a plain reading of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that it was not intended
to include artificial entities within its scope. The debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment further reinforce this conclusion; in fact,
these debates are devoid of even a single reference to the protection
of corporations.134 Representative John Bingham, the amendment’s
primary author, explained that the purpose of the amendment was to
ensure that “no man, no matter what his color, no matter beneath
what sky he may have been born . . . shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due process of law.”135 Clearly, the drafters of
our Constitution had little trouble distinguishing between the rights
of corporations and those of natural persons, unlike those who would
support the natural person theory. Indeed, the notion that corporations are people under the Constitution did not become a part of our
country’s legal tradition until the infamous Santa Clara footnote, and
thus entered constitutional dialogue “without argument, without justification, without explanation, and without dissent.”136
The Court’s opinion in Citizens United employs a theory of corporate personhood that is divorced from reality, logic, and the intent of
the framers. Considerations of stare decisis aside,137 the Court ar132. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 12-15; see also Winkler, supra note 104, at
865 (“Although corporations were widespread and well known at [the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting], the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend
to grant corporations these rights.” (footnote omitted)).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134. See Graham, The Conspiracy Theory I, supra note 54, at 385-92 (analyzing the
text of the congressional debates regarding the Fourteenth Amendment).
135. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1094 (1866), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwcglink.html#anchor39. This interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment was likewise recognized by the Court, which held that “[t]he term
citizens . . . applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to
the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed.” Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868).
136. Winkler, supra note 104, at 865.
137. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion lambastes the majority for its purportedly
improper treatment of stare decisis. Stevens claims that the constitutional issue was not
properly before the court and that, even assuming it was, the case could have been resolved
on a number of narrower grounds, obviating the need to reach the constitutional question.
According to Stevens, “[t]he only thing preventing the majority from affirming the District
Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin.”
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 938 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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rived at the wrong conclusion in equating the First Amendment
rights of corporations and natural beings.
VI. THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED
At first glance, there is some reason to believe that the practical
impact of Citizens United may be somewhat limited. To begin with,
the now invalidated sections of § 441b pertaining to electioneering
communications were somewhat limited in scope. Although the majority opinion attempted to characterize § 441b as a complete ban,138
the reality is that the restrictions on electioneering materials operated only during a relatively short period immediately preceding elections. Corporations were already free to use their general treasury
funds to support electioneering materials outside of that window.
Furthermore, corporate PACs were completely exempt from this prohibition and could release electioneering materials at any time of
their choosing. Many of these PACs are almost as well-funded and
capable as the corporations themselves. Justice Stevens notes in his
dissent that PACs raised nearly a billion dollars in the 2008 election
cycle.139 Thus, the limited nature of § 441b suggests that corporations
may not have gained much through its invalidation.
Even aside from these considerations, there is some support for
the position that corporate campaign spending is relatively slight in
our elections. A 2003 study that examined corporate PAC spending
found that individual donor expenditures still constitute the vast majority of campaign spending.140 The study notes that individual citizen expenditures in the 2000 presidential election totaled nearly $2.4
billion, compared to only $380 million worth of corporate general
treasury expenditures.141 The study also concludes that there is little
statistical correlation between corporate campaign expenditures and
favorable voting behavior in Congress.142 Still other studies claim
that corporate expenditures are actually correlated with negative
economic returns, a phenomenon which, if true, may dissuade corporations from making large election expenditures altogether.143 Taken

ing). “The only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this Court.” Id. at 942. Stevens also criticizes the majority’s extensive reliance on
Bellotti, a case easily distinguished from Citizens United. See id. at 958-61.
138. See id. at 911.
139. Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is
There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 108 (2003).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 112-17.
143. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke & Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency? (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670.
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together, these facts suggest that the impact of Citizens United may
be less sweeping than some fear.
While it is true that corporations have spent relatively little
through their PACs, this ultimately should not be of much consolation to the concerned citizen. Citizens United has drastically altered
the face of campaign finance law and has created some uncertainty
about corporate behavior moving forward. Now that large corporations do not have to bother establishing PACs or navigating FEC
regulations, it is highly plausible that they will engage in more
spending.144 Furthermore, large corporations possess tremendous
wealth that can be easily mobilized; even the best-funded PACs could
not truly hope to reach such levels of funding. As previously mentioned, Exxon Mobil generated profits of over $40 billion in 2008
alone.145 With even a marginal investment of some of these proceeds,
it could easily outspend the entire Obama campaign, itself historic
for shattering previous funding records by raising $750 million.146
The aforementioned studies which discuss the dearth of corporate
PAC spending in American elections may become irrelevant in this
new age where corporations do not need to establish segregated
funds for their campaign spending efforts.
Should corporate money enter the electoral system in such volumes, it may become impossible for natural citizens to influence the
course of political debate. How could an advocacy group like Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth or Moveon.org, let alone an individual citizen, possibly hope to influence thought about political issues if forced
to compete with the vast resources of corporate titans? “[W]hen corporations grab up the prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an election, they can flood the market with advocacy that bears ‘little or no
correlation’ to the ideas of natural persons or to any broader notion of
the public good . . . .” 147 This reality poses a threat not only to the
value of First Amendment rights possessed by actual persons but also to democratic participation itself, as average citizens may feel discouraged from engaging in a system dominated by corporate interests. “Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of
144. This Note was written several months before the 2010 midterm elections. Now
that those elections have occurred, it is possible to begin evaluating this prediction. Campaign spending did indeed rise dramatically in the 2010 midterms; the Center for Responsive Politics reports that independent expenditures and electioneering communication
spending more than quadrupled from the 2006 midterms, rising to roughly $294 million
from approximately $68 million. Center for Responsible Politics, Outside Spending,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
145. Ellis, supra note 12.
146. Tahman Bradley, Final Fundraising Figure: Obama’s $750M, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5,
2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=6397572
147. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 974 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))
(citation omitted).
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undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call
the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance.’ ”148
A related concern is democratic responsiveness: how will the leadership and decisions of our elected officials be affected by this potential new influx of campaign money? Presumably, our representatives
will feel more indebted to the corporation that spends $500 million on
favorable electioneering material than they will to the middle-class
parent who donates $50. The evidence amassed by Congress in considering the adoption of BCRA section 203 suggests that this is indeed a real problem. The congressional record indicates that corporate sponsors of favorable issue ads “were routinely granted special
access [to elected officials] after the campaign was over.”149 One former Senator candidly admitted this reality, noting that “[c]andidates
whose campaigns benefit from [phony “issue ads”] greatly appreciate
the help of these groups. In fact, members will also be favorably disposed to those who finance these groups when they later seek access
to discuss pending litigation.”150 This phenomenon becomes even
more troubling when one considers the broad language used in the
majority opinion, which could be employed by foreign corporations to
gain access to our electoral system. As Justice Stevens explains:
If taken seriously, [the majority’s] assumption that the identity of
a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate
political speech would lead to some remarkable conclusions. Such
an assumption would have accorded the propaganda broadcasts to
our troops by “Tokyo Rose” during World War II the same protection as speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would
appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations
controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans . . . .151

Such an application of Citizens United would dramatically undermine the ability of natural-born Americans to be heard and the willingness of elected representatives to listen.
A potentially larger danger of Citizens United is simply the precedent it sets. Simply put, constitutional rights are extremely difficult
to retract once granted: “Having once named the corporate form as a
‘person,’ it may be difficult to turn back.”152 We do not know how
many other useful state and federal laws will now be invalidated
based on the holding of Citizens United. The Court’s decision to
148. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) (quoting Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)).
149. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 556 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting testimony of former Senator Dale Bumpers).
151. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Piety, supra note 123, at 2683.
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equate the identity of corporations and persons “may have serious
implications for the government’s ability to regulate in the public interest, which may in turn have negative social consequences for
health, safety, and general welfare.”153 For example, a state law prohibiting out-of-state corporations from spending money on domestic
elections, a seemingly reasonable restriction, may now be invalid under the holding of Citizens United. What effect might Citizens United
have on judicial elections or judicial independence more generally? In
recent years, judicial elections have become inappropriately heated
and partisan affairs.154 Citizens United could operate to undermine
state laws designed to limit the impact of campaign spending on judicial elections. Worse yet, “the likely explosion of special-interest
spending in . . . judicial races threatens to further erode the
judiciary’s independence.”155
While the full impact of Citizens United may not be understood for
some time, there is much reason to be concerned. This is a decision
that could undermine the individual’s practical ability to engage in
speech. Furthermore, this precedent jeopardizes the political accountability of our elected representatives and threatens the independence of our judiciary. Citizens United could also be used to strike
down scores of other valuable regulations on corporate behavior.
VII. CONCLUSION
A national poll conducted shortly after the Court’s decision in Citizens United demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of citizens—both liberals and conservatives alike—disagree with the outcome of the case.156 Perhaps those polled recognize what the Citizens
United Court did not: corporate spending power poses a major threat
to the electoral process, and corporations are not among those protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, both sentiments are accurate. In reaching its decision, the Citizens United court relied on a
theory of corporate personhood that is divorced from reality, logic,
and constitutional history. Its holding that the First Amendment protects the political speech of corporations and persons equally is simply wrong, as the Constitution was written to guarantee the rights of
153. Id. at 2587.
154. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
267-69 (2008).
155. Adam Skaggs, Judging for Dollars, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 3, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/judging-dollars.
156. Michael B. Keegan, Poll: Liberals and Conservatives Strongly Disagree with “Citizens United”—Americans Want Limits on Corporate Cash in Elections, HUFFINGTON POST
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living persons. While the effects of Citizens United are not yet discernable, there is much reason to believe that its holding will result
in significantly increased corporate campaign spending and severely
decreased political responsiveness. Furthermore, there is no telling
what other laws will now be invalidated in the name of corporate
personhood. We know not where the Swift Boat of corporate electoral
spending will take us, but it is likely that our destination will not be
a pleasant one.

